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Abstract
In this paper we will examine the nature of a semantic field for the
ditransitive construction in English. In Conceptual Semantics it is im-
plicitly assumed that one event or state belongs to one simple semantic
field. I will call it the "simple semantic field" hypothesis. The ditran-
sitive construction, however, exhibits behaviors which suggest the event
described does not correspond to one simple semantic field. Rather in
that case it is reasonable to consider that two semantic fields are merged.
This will be called the "merged semantic field" hypothesis. Semantic field
merger is motivated by a general process in human conceptualization, i.e.,
metonymy. Our motivation view of semantic field merger makes a differ-
ent empirical prediction from the stipluatory view according to which the
merged field is stipulated in the 'universal grammar' in the same way as
other simple fields.
Introduction
Recent conceptual-oriented semantic theories share the view that a concept
encoded by a linguistic expression cannot be characterized without reference to
a broader conceptual domain. Any definition of linguistic meaning necessarily
depends on the conceptual domain, which is called in various temrs such as a
frame ([1]), a domain ([2]; [3]), and a semantic field ([4], [5]; [6]). The present,
paper examines the nature of the conceptual domain for the ditransitive con-
struction in English'.
One of the most detailed analyses of the English ditransitive construction
semantics at the present time is that of Pinker([6]) or Jackendoff([5]), both of
which is made within the framework of Conceptual Semantics([4], [5]). In this
theory it is implicitly assumed that an event or a state has to be assigned one
simple semantic field. This entails that if events or states differ with respect to
the semantic field, they are necessarily identified as different events or states.
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This assumption will be called the 'simple semantic field' hypothesis. Examin-
ing the nature of the semantic field of the ditransitive expressions, I will argue
that it is reasonable to recognize a cognitive process of merging sematnic fields'.
I will call this idea the 'merged semantic field' hypothesis.
In the next section I will survery the basic device of Conceptual Semantics
and examine Pinker's and Jackendoff's particular analyses of the distransitive
construction respectively. In section 3, I will point out how they fail to account
for the meaning of the distransitive construciton and why they do so. In the
final section as an alternative analysis I will offer the 'merged semantic field'
hypothesis and then discuss a cognitive motivation for the merger of semantic
fields.
2 The Conceptual Semantic analyses
2.1 The basic organization of Conceptual Semantics
First of all, we will take a brief look at the basic machinery of Conceptual
Semantics which will be particularly relevant for the following argument. In the
theory the meaning of an expression is identified with a conceptual structure3.
The conceptual structures attainable by a human being are specified by universal
conceptual well-formed rules. Some of them will be shown in (1):
(1) a. EVENT fpL—vent GO aming X ], [Path Y ])]
b. STATE —* [State il AVE( rahing X ],
 [Thing Y ])]
C. PATH --+ [Path {
	
( [Thing X ])]
The conceptual categories EVENT and STATE are marked with a particu-
lar semantic field feature(e.g., spatial, temporal, possessive, etc.([4, Ch. 9 and
Ch. 10])). Following Gruber([7]), Jackendoff proposes that there are partic-
ular schematic structures common across semantic fields. The structures for
concepts of spatial location and translational motion are generalized in a quasi-
metaphorical way to the other semantic fields. This is called the Thematic
Relation Hypothesis, formulated as in (2):
(2) the Thematic Relation Hypothesis
In any semantic field of EVENTs and STATEs, the principal event-, and
state-, path-, and place-functions are subsets of those used for the analysis
of spatial location and motion. Fields differ in only three possible ways:
a. what sorts of entities may appear as theme;
b. what sorts of entities may appear as reference objects;
c. what kind of relation assumes the role played by location in the field
of spatial expressions.
([4, P. 188])
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In Coceptual Semantics the spatial and the possessive fields are subject to (2), so
spatial EVENTs or STATEs and possessive EVENTs or STATEs are analyzed
as structurally parallel. Jackendoff characterizes the possessive field like (3):
(3) the possessive field:
a. THINGs appear as theme.
b. THINGs appear as reference object.
c. Being alienably possessed plays the role of location; that is, "y has/
possesses x" is the conceptual parallel to spatial "x is at y."
([4, p. 192])
For example, the sentence Anny gave the doll to Beth will be analyzed as mean-
ing that "Anny caused the doll to go to Beth in the possessive sense."
2.2 Pinker(1989)'s analysis
In Pinker([6, p. 211])'s view the prepositional dative construction means 'x
causes y to go to z in a possessive sense; on the other hand, the ditransitive con-
struction means 'a; causes z to have y.' In his descriptive system sub-events or
-states are linked by one of causal subordinators which are universally specified4.
In the ditransitive construction the main event is Agent's acting upon the Pa-
tient/Possessor and the subordinated event is the latter's possession of the gift.
Thus its semantic structure will be:
(4)
	
	
Bob ] A , [ Sue ] A )][ [Event
[EFFECT[State
tACTpossessive([
We note two characteristics in the conceptual structure of (4). First, in the
ditransitive construction the Patient role is assumed by the new possessor(Sue
in (4)) since in Pinker's system that role is defined as the second argument of
the ACT function. Second, what is caused by the first event is the possession
state, as is shown by the fact that it takes the HAVE function. Thus, we may
say that, if Pinker's analysis is correct, the ditransitive construciton does not
imply any type of translational motion, whether possessive or spatial.
2.3 Jackendoff(1990)'s analysis
Jackendoff notes that verbs which take the double-object complement consist
of two classes; they exhibit different behaviors with respect to (a) whether the
Goal argument can be marked by a preposition other than to in the prepositional
dative structure and (b) which argument is optional in the ditransitive structure:
(5) a. Sam threw/sent/kicked/hurled/hit the ball to Sandy/out the win-
dow/into the park/away. ([5, p. 198])
b. Adam gave a book/served a dinner/told a long story/paid $5 to Deb-
bie/*out the window/*down the road/*into the fire. ([5, p. 198])
(6) a. Sam threw/sent/kicked/hurled/hit (Bill) the ball. ([5, p. 198])
HAVE([ Sue ], [ ring D]]
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b. i. Adam served Debbie (her dinner).
ii. Adam told Debbie (a long story).
iii. Adam paid Debbie ($5).
iv. *Adam gave Debbie (a book) 5 . ([5, p. 198])
From these contrasts Jackendoff concludes that verbs in the (b) examples above
lexically encode ownership change while verbs in the (a) examples do not;
rather they come to encode it through a general correspondence rule, named
the Recipient NP Adjunct rule. Roughly speaking, this rule adds the structure
[FOR[G0,.....ive([ ], [ Di] to the lexical conceptual structure of the verb and
links the first and the second argument of GO,...esiive to the Theme argument
and the Goal argument respectively in the spatial motion structure originally
specified by the verbs 6 . For example, the conceptual structures of give and
throw will be shown in (7) and (8) respectively:
CAUSElaunch([
(8) AFF — (I )w,[ E9k )[
[FOR[GOpossessive([ 7
a ], [G0([ f3 P ' , [TO[ r])])
], [TO [ 6 ]]) â
As is clear from (7) and (8), the give-type ditransitive construction encodes
ownership change in terms of 'metaphorical' motion, and the throw-type ditran-
sitive construction encodes spatial motion which causes ownership change that
is also conceptualized as 'metaphorical' motion. Note that Jackendoff also does
not think that spatial motion is involved in the semantics of the ditransitive
construction of the give-type. However, it exhibits behaviors which suggest that
spatial motion is involved there.
3 Ownership change and spatial motion in the
ditransitive construction
The ditransitive construction can take an adjunct prepositional phrase which
denotes a spatial path, as seen in (9):
(9) a. John gave Mary candy from his pocket.
b. Cobb handed a cold beer from the cooler ...
	 (John Grisham, A
Time to Kill, p. 2)
Note that in (9) the prepositional phrases are not an adnominal modifier since
(a) they can be separated by an adverbial phrase from the preceding noun, (b)
they can also be fronted to the sentence initial position, and (c) they can be
excluded from a deictic noun phrase:
(10) a. John gave me candy quickly form his pocket.
(7)	 AFF+ ([	 [ et)
[ CAUSE([ ], [GO possessivea Lk) [TO [ 1])])
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b. ?From his pocket John gave me candy.
c. John gave me this from the bag and gave me that from his pocket.
In Pinker's descriptive system, the semantic structure of (9a) will be repre-
sented as in (11):
[ [Event ACTpossessive([ John ] A , [ Mary ]k)]
11 [EFFECTrstateHAVE([ Mary ], [ candy DB()	 E
MEANS [Event ACT1
spatiala Mary ], [ candy ]k)]
[EFFECT LEvent G0([ candy ], [path FROM[ pocket ]1A)11 ]
The semantic structure in (11), however, has problems. First, in (13) we have
to stipulate an idiosyncratic meaning for the preposition from. The causal
relation marked by the subordinator 'means' and the embedded events are in-
troduced into the semantic structure of the ditransitive construction just when
the prepositional phrase from his pocket is added. Thus the prepositional phrase
corresponds to that part of the semantic structure. But the form-meaning corre-
spondence is ad-hoc since the prepositional phrase headed by from is ordinarily
associated with the PATH structure. Moreover, that special form-meaning cor-
respondence seems to be found only in the ditransitive construction. If so, it
is left unanswered why from expresses that complex meaning only when it oc-
curs in the ditransitive construction. The second problem is concerned with
the subordinate relation. In (11) the event which belongs to the spatial field is
embedded in the event which belongs to the possessive field through the causal
subordinator 'means.' But in similar cases ownership change and spatial motion
events cannot stand in the same subordinate relation:
(12) a. *John gave Mary his car by driving it from his house.
b. *John gave Mary his book by shipping it to her office.
In Pinker's descriptive system, (12a) will be given the following semantic struc-
ture:
()	 [
[Event ACTpossessive([ John ] A , [ Mary ]A)]
13
[
[EFFECT[s tateHAVE([ Mary ], [ car ]A)]]
MEANS [Event ACTspatial([ John ], [ car ])][EFFECT[EventG0([ car ], [path FROM[ house BM
This semantic structure is the same as that in (11) in relevant respects: the event
which belongs to the spatial field is embedded in the event which belongs to the
possessive field by the subordinate relation of 'means.' Unlike (9a), however,
(12a) is unacceptable. Since examples in (12) are grammatically well-formed and
paragmatically the situations they describe are not so hard to imagine, they are
unacceptable for some semantic reason. I will assume here that spatial motion
simultaneously accompanied with ownership change cannot be subordinated by
the 'means' relation. If it is correct, the semantic structure in (11), which may
be the only possiblity under Pinker's descriptive system, cannot be well-formed.
The third problem is that the ditransitive construction cannot cooccur with
some spatial prepositional phrase, as in (14):
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(14) *John gave Mary candy into her room.
The semantic structure assigned to (14) in Pinker's system may be the same as
(11) except the Path function of the embedded spatial motion event. However,
since the conceptual formation rules are context-free, any path phrase cannot
prevent the structure from appearing. Therefore, the unacceptability of (14)
cannot be accounted for in a principled way. So far we have discussed the
problems for Pinker's analysis, but the same criticism applies to Jackendoff's
analysis. In my view, these problems originate from the same source, i.e., their
implicit assumption that evnets which belong to different semantic fields are
individualized as different events and cannot be conceptualized as a single event.
This assumption can be formulated as in (15):
(15) The "Simple Semantic Field" Hypothesis
A single event or state in a semantic structure must belong to a single
simple semantic field.
In order to solve the problems discussed so far, I will examine an alternative
possibility, i.e., the possibility that events which otherwise belong to different
semantic fields are conceptually fused into a single events.
4 Semantic field merger and its cognitive mo-
tivation
If two events involve different kinds of relations, e.g., ownership change and
spatial motion, yet occurs simultaneously and closely interrelate with each other
in terms of the achievement of the purpose of the action, it is not unreasonable
that a human conceptualizer does not individualize them as independent events
but rather merges them into a single event. This amounts to what I call the
"merged semantic field" hypothesis:
(16) The "Merged Semantic Field" Hypothesis
A single event in a semantic structure can belong to a single but non-
simple semantic field, which is fomred by merging two different semantic
fields.
Ownership change and spatial motion described in (9a) above occurs simulta-
neously and they are causally corelated with each other. In other words, they
are temporally and causally overlapped. Thus on our account (9a) will be given
the semantic structure as in (17):
[FROM [ [John]	 Ili{[CAUSE([John], [GO	 ([candy], [	 [pocketjA
	 )1)]pow
[TO[Mary]]
spat
[AFF+ ([John] A , [Mary]A)]
(17)
In (17) the event on the thematic tier belongs to the merged semantic field, i.e.,
the possessive/spatial field. Given this semantic structure, the first and second
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problems in the preceding section will disappear. As shown in (17), the preposi-
tion from corresponds to the PATH structure [FROM[ John/his pocket ]] only.
This is the same form-meaning association as is seen elsewhere. Furtheremore,
since in (19) ownership change and spatial motion are not individualized as sep-
arate events, they need not be linked by a causal subordinator.
There is also independent eveidence for the merger of possessive and spatial
fields. Thus consider:
(18) a. John took twenty dollars from Mary.
b. John took twenty dollars from Mary's wallet.
c. Someone stole the famous drawing from a collector in Chicago.
d. Someone stole the famous drawing from the house of a collector in
Chicago.
As shown in (18), the verbs take and steal can take as their complement the
spatial source phrase as well as the possessive source phrase. Even if they take
the spatial source phrase, they still imply the (unlawful) causation of ownership
change. This is exactly the same situation which we have seen in the ditransitive
sentences like (9). The only difference between them is that take and steal is
necessarily situated in the merged field as their lexical convention but give does
not always belong to it since give may denote ownership change involving no
spatial motion. Moreover, a phenomenon similar to what I call the semantic
field merger is observed in the semantics of a noun. Lakoff([8, p. 74]) notes
that the meaning of mother "is based on a complex model in which a number
of individual cognitive models combine, forming a cluster model."
Evidence observed so far suggests the plausibility of semantic field merger.
But why can semantic field merger take happen in the first place? Is there any
motivation for it? First, consider the following examples:
(19) a. John gave his daughter a land.
b. John gave his daughter a house.
c. John gave his daughter a car.
d. John gave his daughter a computer.
e. John gave his daughter a rose.
All these examples imply ownership change in which John's (or some other per-
son's) daughter received a gift from him. On the other hand, all of them do not
equally imply spatial motion. (19a) may be impossible to interpret as implying
spatial motion, yet as we go down further we will more easily get the inter-
pretation and we naturally and preferentially understand that spatial motion
is implied. In sentences like (19e) the concept of ownership change evokes that
of spatial motion probably because, in our everyday experience, when giving a
rose to someone, a person usually brings it to her or him. In that case we can
say that ownership change and spatial motion stand in a 'contiguous' relation
to each other.
The extension process by which a linguistic form come to encode a concept
which is 'contiguous' to its original concept is frequently found. It may be called
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metonymy since "the essence of metonymy resides in the possibility of estab-
lishing connections between entities which co-occur within a given conceptual
domain" [9, pp. 123-124]. And the metonymic process proceeds gradually([10,
p. 74]). Schematically the metonymic extension of a construction will be repre-
sented as in (20):
	
(20) a. F 	 M1
b. F 	 M
M2
c. F 	 Mi/M2
d. F 	 M2
F: a syntactic form of a construction
M: the inherent meaning of a construction or its pragmatic concomi-
tant meaning
Suppose (20a) represents the first stage of metonymic extension, at which a
construction form F only encodes its original inherent meaning M1. The second
stage is (20b), in which another concept M2 is pragmatically implied from the
original meaning, thus M2 is associated to F through M2. The third stage is
shown in (20c), where association between F and M2 has grown stronger and
M2 has become more integral to the construction. (20d) is the final stage,
where the previous pragmatic concomitant itself has been conventionalized as
the inherent meaning of the construction. Semantic field merger may be taken
to occur around the stage of (20c) 7 . It is at this stage that two meanings
are connected most closely. Here I will not argue that semantic field merger
always occur in the metonymic extension. Instead I only claim that it takes
places only if semantic fields to be merged are metonymically related. As to
the ditransitive construction, the extension has not reached the final stage at
present(e.g., (20a)). This means that M2, i.e., the concept of spatial motion
in the present case, has not yet completely acquired the status as the inherent
constructional meaning. Thus, to an extent it is still dependent on MI, the
concept of ownership change. Therefore, a specificaiton of spatial motion in the
ditransitive construction has to be harmonized with that of ownership change.
It cannot be incompatible with what is implied with respect to ownership change
in the construction. This will give an answer to the third problem pointed out
in the preceding section, i.e., the unacceptability of the sentence * John gave
Mary candy into her room. As noted by Goldberg([12, p. 56]), the ditransitive
construction implies that the recipient volitionally receives the gift. Thus in the
context of the recipient's failure or refusal to receive the gift the ditransitive
sentences will be bizarre:
(21) *John gave Mary a leaflet, but she didn't receive it.
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From these it will follow that if we adjoin a prepositional phrase for the spatial
goal to a ditransitive sentence, it must specify the location which is unam-
biguously understood as the location where the recipient actually gets the gift.
Putting candy into her bag, however, does not imply that Mary actually received
it. The same explanation will apply to other examples as in (22):
(22)	 a. *Bill gave John a sandwich to Bob. ([11, p. 370])
b. *John gave me a leaflet into my locker.
c. *John gave me a leaflet into my bag.
d. ?John gave me a leaflet into the pocket of my coat.
At the same time, our account will predict that the ditransitive construction
can cooccur with the goal phrase if it surely and clearly imply the recipient's
acceptance of a gift. This prediction turns out true as in (23):
(23) a. John gave Mary candy into her tiny hand.
b. John handed Mary a baby into her arms.
Hands or arms are the body parts which are typically used to receive an object.
So putting something into these parts implies that the recipient has actually
received it. Note that deriving the merged field on the basis of metonymy is
different from the mere stipulation of it in the universal inventory of semantic
fields. In the stipulatory approach it cannot be explained why (9) is completely
acceptable and at the same time (14) and (22) are not and why (23) are accept-
able unlike (14) and (23) since there is no reason why only the merged field,
unlike the other fields, can make subtle distinctions with respect to the selection
of the Path function and even its argument.
5 Conclusion
In this paper I examined the nature of the semantic field of the English
ditransitive construction. I made two proposals. First, in the ditransitive con-
struction the possessive and the spatial fields can be merged to form a single
semantic field. Second, the merging process is motivated by metonymic concep-
tualization.
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Notes
1. In this paper we will deal with only the ditransitive construction of a to-dative type.
2. Henceforce, I will investigate the nature of semantic field in Conceptual Semantics.
But the idea of semantic field merger discussed below can be shifted to other semantic
theories mentioned above.
3. The conceptual structure is 'conceptual' in that it is a mental representation at the
level at which non-linguistic information, e.g., sensory and motor information, as well
as linguistic information is compatible[4, p. 17]
4. Pinker gives five pairs of subordinating causal relations: 'effect' vs. 'cause', 'but' vs.
`despite', 'let' vs. 'prevent', 'for/to' vs. 'means', and 'obligate' vs. 'fulfill.' See [6,
pp. 200-204].
5. As Jackendoff notes[5, p. 198], give requires as its lexical property that both Theme
and Goal be syntactically realized.
6. For the precise formulation, see [5, p. 199, pp. 273-274].
7. More rigidly this might be incorrect since conventionalizastion of pragmatically con-
comitant meaning is a matter of degree. Thus the distinction between (20b) and (20c)
involves simplification. In the more realistic view, the association between the con-
struction form and the pragmatic meaning will become stronger gradually and finally
reach the point at which they are no longer separable in any context as shown in (20d).
